Tuesday, May 26, 2009

"The State of the Intellectual Property Debate at LRC"

 

Not sure this is a proper way of doing it, but I’m going to steal the debate and move it here.

 

 
"The State of the Intellectual Property Debate at LRC"
25 Comments - Show Original Post Collapse comments

Blogger Stewart said...

I think there is an important distinction between what Tucker is speaking against, and what Rockwell is speaking against.
In the former case, Tucker thinks that the "property" aspect of intellectual property is no such thing. That is, that publicly-available information cannot be owned. In the latter case, Rockwell is speaking against the idea that government should use force to compel private organizations to give away private information.
These two positions are entirely reconcilable. If the manufacturers decided, ultimately, to make their repair codes etc. public, then that information could be copied by anyone. But if they don't make it public, the government has no business forcing them to do so.

May 22, 2009 12:11 PM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@ Stewart
Just when does something become "publicly available" in your world? The owner of the book Tucker is discussing is clearly not interested in the terms Tucker is offering. Yet somehow, in your world, Tucker has the right to usurp this owners rights and not those of the owner of manufacturing code?

May 22, 2009 12:28 PM

OpenID savecapitalism said...

Is there a title/release-date planned for the coming book? The intellectual property debate is raging here in Sweden, so it would be very interesting to read more on the topic ....

May 22, 2009 12:36 PM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

I should have more details on a release date, etc. in about a month.

May 22, 2009 1:04 PM

Blogger Stewart said...

@Robert, I don't think the distinction between what is public and what is private is actually that important here. I shouldn't have placed so much emphasis on those words in my earlier post.
What's important for Rockwell's post is whether there is government coercion involved in forcing the dissemination of information. For Tucker's series of posts, the critical factor is whether government coercion is involved in preventing the dissemination of information.
If a car manufacturer uses cryptography or secrecy to prevent others from accessing the car's electronic data, Rockwell's position is that the government should not force them to give the decryption keys away. Tucker's position is that, once those keys are known to the public (whether through reverse engineering, espionage, or the owner's manual), the car manufacturer has no basis for claiming ownership of that information. That also applies to the data which is later acquired using those decryption keys, such as internal programming data for the onboard computer.
So these are two different arguments. Whether Rockwell and Tucker agree on them is unclear from the posts you linked to. I suspect that they do, given their respective roles at the LvMI, but it's not necessary that they do in order to reconcile the two positions, because they aren't mutually exclusive.

May 22, 2009 2:07 PM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@ Stewart
Let me make it simple. I write a one page analysis of the economy, I give it to you under the condition that you do not show it to anyone else, are you saying I have no righht to contract with you this way, that I must encrypt it?

May 22, 2009 2:42 PM

Blogger Stewart said...

If I sign that contract, and if I do show it to someone, then I've obviously violated our contract. To that extent, I think you're correct.
In order to extend that logic to the contemporary system of copyrights, however, you have to believe that everyone is implicitly agreeing to contracts between themselves and the creators of every piece of original material that they encounter.
Suppose that I do violate our contract, and I distribute your work to my colleagues. Even if we agree that I hold some moral culpability for that transgression, it's not at all clear that my colleagues have done anything wrong by accepting the paper from me. And if they continue to distribute it on their own, it's hard to see how they're violating any contract with you, since no such contract existed.
Now, you may see that as being akin to accepting and reselling stolen goods. That presupposes that the information itself is your property, however. The contract alone cannot establish that.

May 22, 2009 3:26 PM

Blogger James Rothfeld said...

It is actually possible - conceptually - to have something resembling current copyright in a libertarian social order: ISP companies, copy machine manufacturers, and others, can make a condition in their terms of use that copyright is to be respected, and that if anybody uses their technology to violate copyright, then they are liable to pay damages to the ISP or manufacturer. You could further make a condition of purchase that you shall only sell the copy machine if you agree to have the purchaser agree to these terms as well, and so forth.
Even better, manufacturers of computers can make this a condition for the use of their product, and if you violate that provision, you will be taken to court under common contract law for violating the terms of your contract.
There is nothing in libertarian theory that makes such conditional ownership transfer illegitimate.
Of course, this leaves the possibilities of rival companies offering their products without such contracts... and let free competition take care of the argument.

May 23, 2009 2:49 PM

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Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@ James Rothfeld
I absolutely agree.
@James Rothfeld and @Stewart
I do note that both of you are not specifically addressing the Tucker view, but if you check his writings,it is clear in his world that private contracts for intellectual creations would not be legitimate.
In his world intellectually created works would not come with ownership rights, even if the creator will only release them under those terms! They are free for all to use, and some how not violate property rights.

May 23, 2009 3:09 PM

Blogger James Rothfeld said...

The reason I do not address Tucker's argument is because it is probably one of the lousiest articles on the issue I have read in a long time. :)
And I've no hesitation to rant and rail against the patent laws and argue till the cows come home that patent law as it exists now creates a) plain old rent-seeking, and b) creates waste by forcing people to invent around the patent law.
Basic question about tucker's argument: does the noodle company KNOW how the noodle is designed? Because once it KNOWS it, there is no legitimate way to stop it from using this knowledge.
So, while you the economist have a right to bind the person you gave your paper to a promise not to publish it, should this person LOSE the paper, and I find it, I can, of course, publish it - provided I am not in the process violating any contractual obligations I may have entered to otherwise (such as using a copy machine I bought under condition of NOT violating copyright)....

May 23, 2009 4:43 PM

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Blogger Stewart said...

@Robert, if Tucker really does believe that individuals can't enter into voluntary contracts regarding their own behavior, then I agree with you entirely. That idea is ridiculous on its face.
@James, your question about the noodles is essentially Tucker's point. It's only the temporary monopoly that the government grants patent-holders which prevents the company from making whatever kinds of noodles it likes.
And your last paragraph captures my earlier point nicely: A contact can only (voluntarily) constrain the behavior of the parties who sign it. For everyone else, there is no constraint, and therefore no sense of intellectual ownership.

May 23, 2009 6:51 PM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

Tucker on rights to your own intellectual creations:
If you have an idea, it is yours. You can do with it what you want. If you share it (sing, speak, broadcast, let others see the products of your ideas), others then have copies of it. They are entitled to do with their copies of the idea precisely what you can do with your idea. They can use it how they want provided they don't prevent others from doing with it what they want. This is a simple application of the non-aggression principle that governs a free society. Whether it is fashion, language, know how, or whatever, people are free to copy...What can you copy? Anything and everything. This is not "taking" anything from anyone. The original idea owner still has his. Other people now have their copies, and are free to improve it...You can even re-republish it under your own name, though that would amount to the socially repudiated vice of plagiarism (vice, not crime).
http://tinyurl.com/qlayfr

May 23, 2009 7:46 PM

Blogger James Rothfeld said...

I don't see an immediate contradiction between Tucker's position in the last article you quote, and mine - maybe only because it does NOT discuss the issue of what happens when I have a contract with the person I share my idea with not to copy it.
I think that's the point about the book issue: if it is my book, and i gave it to you - the publisher - with the condition you not publish it without my consent, or that of my heirs, then you are bound to honor that commitment.
no?

May 23, 2009 8:26 PM

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Blogger Stewart said...

Robert, I think you may not fully understand Jeff Tucker's position. Nothing in that excerpt suggests that a person can't enter into a contract regarding intellectual creations. A constraint based on contracts is entirely different from a constraint based on a natural, default right to intellectual property.
Suppose that I possess the only known copy of a never-published play by Shakespeare. I don't have any intellectual property rights over this play, but I nonetheless have complete control over its distribution, since I hold the only copy. As a condition of giving you a copy, suppose that I make you sign a contract saying that you will never redistribute it.
I don't think that Jeff Tucker would have any problem with that contract. The excerpt you posted earlier is a description of what you, me, or anyone else can do with a Shakespearean play qua a Shakespearean play. Of course he isn't talking about the works of a long-dead author. But for Tucker, there is no difference (property-wise, anyway) between the intellectual works of Shakespeare, and the intellectual works of you or me. For most people, the informational content of the play cannot be owned due to its age, but for Tucker that content cannot be owned period.If you throw a contract into the scenario, it is no different. In my example above, you may very well be contractually prevented from redistributing the play, but you would not be under that constraint by default, or because of the nature of the play itself. With true intellectual property, the constraint is there even without your agreement, and it's that implicit constraint which Tucker argues against.

May 23, 2009 9:25 PM

Blogger Stewart said...

Oh drat.
I need to qualify what I just wrote. Upon a closer reading, Jeff does seem to contradict my interpretation:
"They can use it how they want provided they don't prevent others from doing with it what they want."If he means what you are implying he means, then I think you're right to criticize him. That statement is just silly.

May 23, 2009 9:28 PM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@JamesRothfeld and @Stewart
One problem with Tucker is that he is not a very precise writer. When he says you can copy anything, it is of course open to the clause, unless the original creator by contract prohibits such.
Tucker in the passage I quote simply does not address this point clearly yeah or nay. However, I am quite sure that a full reading of Tucker's views on the topic would clearly show my interpretation of his meaning in the quote that he does not believe that you can have a contract based on the work of intellectual property. That's why he says you can copy anything.
I quote Tucker from another piece:
"But some may object that protecting IP is no different from protecting regular property. That is not so. Real property is scarce. The subjects of IP are not scarce, as Stephan Kinsella explains. Images, ideas, sounds, arrangements of letters on a page: these can be reproduced infinitely. For that reason, they can't be considered to be owned."
http://tinyurl.com/23toxg

May 24, 2009 6:36 AM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@JamesRothfeld and @Stewart
Here's Tucker explaining Kinsella:
"He made a strongly theoretical argument that ideas are not scarce, do not require rationing, are not diminished by their dissemination, and so cannot really be called property. All IP is unjust, he wrote. It is inconsistent with libertarian ethics and contrary to a free market. He favors the complete repeal of all intellectual-property laws."
http://tinyurl.com/9px9gd
Tucker again is not completely clear, but it is implied, if something can't be owned, you really can't have a contract about it.
I really believe that Tucker would say you can't contract with regard to a book. May I suggest you email him and ask. I would do it myself, but he has advised me that he has blocked my emails, after I published, here at EPJ, examples of the vulgar language he sent to me in emails!

May 24, 2009 6:56 AM

Blogger Erick said...

@Robert,
Who gets the copyright/patent when two people invent something independently?
Are thoughts alienable?

May 25, 2009 6:09 AM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@Erick
One of the problems with current IP thought is that it is generally viewed within a statist framework and there is further aggregation of IP protection than is appropriate.
Are thoughts alienable?Absolutely.
What is a consultant, if not a seller of thoughts?
Who gets the copyright/patent when two people invent something independently?This question implies the aggregation trap which I am going to address in detail in my book.
But, the short answer is they both do. If they both invent something independent and are not stealing from each other, then why shouldn't they both have the right to their creations?

May 25, 2009 6:50 AM

Blogger James Rothfeld said...

Erick,
we are not talking about a centrally administered state monopolisitic IP system, but about a common law system. If two people invent something at the same time, both have the right to use it, and to contract it out. Also, if somebody else figures out how do duplicate the invention simply by knowing about what it does, then that is fine, too.
The idea as such is not protectable.
Historic example: Mozart famously attended the performance of a piece of music that the author and owner had protected in so far that any copies of the music were not allowed to be duplicated, and that all performers were contractually obliged not to transcribe it. However, there was no contract that prohibited members of the audience to memorize it and then recreate it indepedently.
http://www.classical.net/music/comp.lst/works/allegri/miserere.php
So that's what Mozart did.
Similar rules can be applied to cinemas: it may not be possible to prohibit the recording of a movie in principle, but it is possible for movie theaters to prohibit its patrons to record it. If anybody does, he would be guilty of violating the property rights of the cinema owner (analog to crying 'fire' in a theater not being illegal, but a property right violation).

May 25, 2009 7:24 AM

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Blogger earth that was said...

I think Lawrence Lessig has staked out a "middle of the road" position on Copyright somewhere to the right of the "abolish all property in IP" position of some libertarians, and the corporatist statist machine that we have seen under DMCA, WIPO and the US government's, essentially protectionist, use of "free trade treaties" to extend it's IP regime around the world.
Lessig's "copyleft" argument strikes me as the genuine "free market" / libertarian one, even though Lessig himself is something of a liberal (a.k.a. social democrat).
More to the point, Lessig's defense of copyright shows that the founders of the American republic knew something about economics too. The following is a brief intro to Lessig's thinking, see here.

May 25, 2009 7:41 AM

Blogger Robert Wenzel said...

@Earth
I am taking things in a completely different direction. See my most recent post:
http://tinyurl.com/h7u6cs

May 25, 2009 9:59 AM

Blogger Erick said...

Interesting discussion!
Robert, this makes a lot of sense to me:
If they both invent something independent and are not stealing from each other, then why shouldn't they both have the right to their creations?I am curious to see how you develop the idea in your forthcoming book!
What is a consultant, if not a seller of thoughts?How does a consultant sell thoughts?
The way I see it, a consultant sells his promise to appear in a certain place, at a certain time, in order to perform certain actions.
I can see how my finger is alienable. I can cut it off and give it to you. I no longer have that finger. I cannot see how I can alienate my thoughts: I can always continue thinking whatever I want.
Nor is there any guarantee that the person purchasing the person's time will gain any specific thinking process. At best there is a guarantee that he will feel certain feelings like "satisfaction".
The closet thing that might come to this are SAT prep classes that guarantee a specific rise in test scores. But how do "your thinking will improve" and "you will have my thoughts" differ?
@James,
there was no contract that prohibited members of the audience to memorize it and then recreate it indepedentlySuppose there was, would it be valid?
Can I sign a contract alienating rights to my brain?

May 25, 2009 11:00 PM

Blogger James Rothfeld said...

Yes, it would have been valid, since it would be a contract regarding action, or restraint from action. "Alienation" has nothing to do with this. Free market copyright regulates not 'ideas' as such, but actions of individuals. Last time I checked, nobody ever argued that we cannot contractually agree to limit our actions - whether it is loud singing in the middle of the night, or looking after somebody kids. Not to copy or reproduce something is merely refraining from a specific type of action.
If I gave you a million dollar under the condition that you never again sing in public, and you accepted this - would that be a valid contract?
If I paid you a million dollar to not reveal a secret about me - would that not be a valid contract?
How is this different from a contract that obliges you not to copy or reproduce something?
At the same time, if two people invent something simultaneously, they are NOT bound contractually to any kind of action.
What would, of course, be possible, is that you happen to work at a private university which stipulates in its contract with you that any invention you make must first be cleared with registry xyz for competing inventions. However, only people who directly or indirectly agreed to this system of clearance would be bound to it.
Again, none of this has anything to do with deep discussions about whether ideas or not are properly 'property' - it's about human action, which any libertarian will agree can be regulated bindingly by contractual agreement.

May 26, 2009 7:20 AM

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Blogger Erick said...

What do you think about Rothbard's thoughts on the matter:
Suppose that Smith makes the following agreement with the Jones Corporation: Smith, for the rest of his life, will obey all orders, under whatever conditions, that the Jones Corporation wishes to lay down. Now, in libertarian theory there is nothing to prevent Smith from making this agreement, and from serving the Jones Corporation and from obeying the latter’s orders indefinitely. The problem comes when, at some later date, Smith changes his mind and decides to leave. Shall he be held to his former voluntary promise? Our contention—and one that is fortunately upheld under present law—is that Smith’s promise was not a valid (i.e., not an enforceable) contract. There is no transfer of title in Smith’s agreement, because Smith’s control over his own body and will are inalienable. Since that control cannot be alienated, the agreement was not a valid contract, and therefore should not be enforceable. Smith’s agreement was a mere promise, which it might be held he is morally obligated to keep, but which should not be legally obligatoryShould we move the conversation to the new post?

May 26, 2009 7:41 PM

Sunday, May 24, 2009

Tata – Good Bye

 

A Boss looking through his Mail Box was astonished to see a mail from an Employee who was supposed to be busy working at Client side on a critical project. It had the subject - "TaTa - Bye Bye". With the worst premonition he opened the mail and read the content with trembling hands:-

Dear Sir,
It is with great regret and sorrow that I'm writing you, but I'm leaving the job. The offer was too lucrative and attractive for me to turn down. I had to abscond because I wanted to avoid a scene with the HR and you. I am sorry but I had no choice.
The project is working fine. There are only 108 issues pending, out of which only 38% issues are High Priority. Hence I am sure there is no need to worry about. The next Phase of major enhancements I have been working upon, have been completed halfway. I am sure the new person who would replace me would not understand what all I had done so far. Hence, for his and your convenience, I have taken care to remove all the work that I had been doing this far for nearly 3 months now. I am sure you will appreciate my insight and "big heart".
I am of course retaining the Originals that I had retrieved for the purpose of Passport verification with me, considering it as a parting gift from you. Of course, I will not pay the bond amount that I owe the company (since I Am breaking the bond). But I will consider this as a parting gift from our Dear company. I moving out of town since the new company is situated in another City.
Also, I have changed my contact number. So you will not be able to get in touch with me, to congratulate me. But I know your blessings are always with me. Last but not the least. I also have the Rs 12000 entrusted to me by our company's cultural events group, for the upcoming movie event. I am sure you would have wanted me to keep it with myself as an added bonus from our company. I respect you very much, hence your wish is my command.
Don't worry sir. I am 2 years experienced now, learning so much from your company. So I will surely use this knowledge to write better programs for the new company. Someday I'm sure we will meet sometime in the future. If you wish, I will surely be glad to give my employee reference for you to apply for a job in the new company which I am joining.
Your faithful employee,
S. W. Engineer

At the bottom of the page were the letters "PS". Hands still trembling, the Boss read:

PS: Dearest Boss, none of the above is true. I'm am still busy working at client side. I just wanted to remind you that there are worse things in life than my "Request to reconsider my Salary Appraisal" attached with this mail. Please approve it and call when it is safe for me to come to our Office to discuss this. My respect and Best Regards to you!

North Korean Traffic Cop tells Mini Driver to take a Hike

 

I’ve been doing a lot of watching of documentaries on North Korea these days, and while I would certainly recommend this and this, I thought the video below provides some more light-hearted view of that place:

 

I really do, however, recommend to watch this one as well, though it may haunt you.

Thursday, May 21, 2009

Top Ten Myths of Entrepreneurship

 

This is an excellent summary of why going out on your own is generally not a very good idea, unless you know exactly what you are doing. For the majority of people, staying employed is probably the best shot.

Top Ten Myths of Entrepreneurship

sas46_65.jpgThis is a guest post by Scott Shane as a follow up to his entrepreneurship test. He is the A. Malachi Mixon Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies at Case Western Reserve University. He is the author of seven books, the latest of which is The Illusions of Entrepreneurship: The Costly Myths That Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Policy Makers Live By. Many entrepreneurs believe a bunch of myths about entrepreneurship, so here are ten of the most common and the realities that bust them:

  1. It takes a lot of money to finance a new business. Not true. The typical start-up only requires about $25,000 to get going. The successful entrepreneurs who don’t believe the myth design their businesses to work with little cash. They borrow instead of paying for things. They rent instead of buy. And they turn fixed costs into variable costs by, say, paying people commissions instead of salaries.

  2. Venture capitalists are a good place to go for start-up money. Not unless you start a computer or biotech company. Computer hardware and software, semiconductors, communication, and biotechnology account for 81 percent of all venture capital dollars, and seventy-two percent of the companies that got VC money over the past fifteen or so years. VCs only fund about 3,000 companies per year and only about one quarter of those companies are in the seed or start-up stage. In fact, the odds that a start-up company will get VC money are about one in 4,000. That’s worse than the odds that you will die from a fall in the shower.

  3. Most business angels are rich. If rich means being an accredited investor –a person with a net worth of more than $1 million or an annual income of $200,000 per year if single and $300,000 if married – then the answer is “no.” Almost three quarters of the people who provide capital to fund the start-ups of other people who are not friends, neighbors, co-workers, or family don’t meet SEC accreditation requirements. In fact, thirty-two percent have a household income of $40,000 per year or less and seventeen percent have a negative net worth.

  4. Start-ups can’t be financed with debt. Actually, debt is more common than equity. According to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Small Business Finances, fifty-three percent of the financing of companies that are two years old or younger comes from debt and only forty-seven percent comes from equity. So a lot of entrepreneurs out there are using debt rather than equity to fund their companies.

  5. Banks don’t lend money to start-ups. This is another myth. Again, the Federal Reserve data shows that banks account for sixteen percent of all the financing provided to companies that are two years old or younger. While sixteen percent might not seem that high, it is three percent higher than the amount of money provided by the next highest source – trade creditors – and is higher than a bunch of other sources that everyone talks about going to: friends and family, business angels, venture capitalists, strategic investors, and government agencies.

  6. Most entrepreneurs start businesses in attractive industries. Sadly, the opposite is true. Most entrepreneurs head right for the worst industries for start-ups. The correlation between the number of entrepreneurs starting businesses in an industry and the number of companies failing in the industry is 0.77. That means that most entrepreneurs are picking industries in which they are mostlikely to fail.

  7. The growth of a start-up depends more on an entrepreneur’s talent than on the business he chooses. Sorry to deflate some egos here, but the industry you choose to start your company has a huge effect on the odds that it will grow. Over the past twenty years or so, about 4.2 percent of all start-ups in the computer and office equipment industry made the Inc 500 list of the fastest growing private companies in the U.S. 0.005 percent of start-ups in the hotel and motel industry and 0.007 percent of start-up eating and drinking establishments made the Inc. 500. That means the odds that you will make the Inc 500 are 840 times higher if you start a computer company than if you start a hotel or motel. There is nothing anyone has discovered about the effects of entrepreneurial talent that has a similar magnitude effect on the growth of new businesses.

  8. Most entrepreneurs are successful financially. Sorry, this is another myth. Entrepreneurship creates a lot of wealth, but it is very unevenly distributed. The typical profit of an owner-managed business is $39,000 per year. Only the top ten percent of entrepreneurs earn more money than employees. And the typical entrepreneur earns less money than he otherwise would have earned working for someone else.

  9. Many start-ups achieve the sales growth projections that equity investors are looking for. Not even close. Of the 590,000 or so new businesses with at least one employee founded in this country every year, data from the U.S. Census shows that less than 200 reach the $100 million in sales in six years that venture capitalists talk about looking for. About 500 firms reach the $50 million in sales that the sophisticated angels, like the ones at Tech Coast Angels and the Band of Angels talk about. In fact, only about 9,500 companies reach $5 million in sales in that amount of time.

  10. Starting a business is easy. Actually it isn’t, and most people who begin the process of starting a company fail to get one up and running. Seven years after beginning the process of starting a business, only one-third of people have a new company with positive cash flow greater than the salary and expenses of the owner for more than three consecutive months.

Read more: "How to Change the World: Top Ten Myths of Entrepreneurship" - http://blog.guykawasaki.com/2008/01/top-ten-myths-o.html#ixzz0GBq6Q3Hp&A

Whiners

 

That pretty much sums it up for me…

image

Why Spelling Don’t Matter

 

Reading_Test.jpg (JPEG Image, 575x600 pixels)

The Galactic Core seen from Earth

 

It is astounding what beauty and wonder exists all around us that we just can never see with unaided eyes. Regretfully so.

Galactic Center of Milky Way Rises over Texas Star Party from William Castleman on Vimeo.

Friday, May 8, 2009

The missing sunspots: Is this the big chill?

 

The Independent has a really interesting article on the current sunspot doldrums.

[A]round the turn of the century things started to change. Within a few years of the Sun’s activity starting to decline, the rise in the Earth’s temperature began to slow and has now been constant since the turn of the century. This was at the same time that the levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide carried on rising. So, is the Sun’s quietness responsible for the tail-off in global warming and if not, what is?

Read the entire article here

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

Krugman was sane once

 

Ok, I have made at least one nasty comment about Krugman on this site. For the sake of fairness, I would like to point out that Krugman was not always a raving madman. One may quibble and nibble on small details in the article below, but it is straight-forward, sound economic analysis.

So, back in 1994, Krugman was still sane. When did that change – and how did that happen?

Without further ado, I present to you – the sane Krugman:

The Myth of Asia’s Miracle

Paul Krugman*

A CAUTIONARY FABLE

ONCE UPON a time, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by a set of Eastern economies. Although those economies were still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West, the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology. The leaders of those nations did not share our faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economics, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West. And a growing minority of Western intellectuals agreed.

The gap between Western and Eastern economic performance eventually became a political issue. The Democrats recaptured the White House under the leadership of a young, energetic new president who pledged to "get the country moving again"--a pledge that, to him and his closest advisers, meant accelerating America's economic growth to meet the Eastern challenge.

The time, of course, was the early 1960s. The dynamic young president was John F. Kennedy. The technological feats that so alarmed the West were the launch of Sputnik and the early Soviet lead in space. And the rapidly growing Eastern economies were those of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

While the growth of communist economics was the subject of innumerable alarmist books and polemical articles in the 1950s, Some economists who looked seriously at the roots of that growth were putting together a picture that differed substantially from most popular assumptions. Communist growth rates were certainly impressive, but not magical. The rapid growth in output could be fully explained by rapid growth in inputs: expansion of employment, increases in education levels, and, above all, massive investment in physical capital. Once those inputs were taken into account, the growth in output was unsurprising--or, to put it differently, the big surprise about Soviet growth was that when closely examined it posed no mystery.

This economic analysis had two crucial implications. First, most of the speculation about the superiority of the communist system including the popular view that Western economics could painlessly accelerate their own growth by borrowing some aspects of that system--was off base. Rapid Soviet economic growth was based entirely on one attribute: the willingness to save, to sacrifice current consumption for the sake of future production. The communist example offered no hint of a free lunch.

Second, the economic analysis of communist countries' growth implied some future limits to their industrial expansion--in other words, implied that a naive projection of their past growth rates into the future was likely to greatly overstate their real prospects. Economic growth that is based on expansion of inputs, rather than on growth in output per unit of input, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns. It was simply not possible for the Soviet economies to sustain the rates of growth of labor force participation, average education levels, and above all the physical capital stock that had prevailed in previous years. Communist growth would predictably slow down, perhaps drastically.

Can there really be any parallel between the growth of Warsaw Pact nations in the 1950s and the spectacular Asian growth that now preoccupies policy intellectuals? At some levels, of course, the parallel is far-fetched: Singapore in the 1990s does not look much like the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew bears little resemblance to the U.S.S.R.'s Nikita Khrushchev and less to Joseph Stalin. Yet the results of recent economic research into the sources of Pacific Rim growth give the few people who recall the great debate over Soviet growth a strong sense of déjà vu. Now, as then, the contrast between popular hype and realistic prospects, between conventional wisdom and hard numbers, remains so great that sensible economic analysis is not only widely ignored, but when it does get aired, it is usually dismissed as grossly implausible.

Popular enthusiasm about Asia's boom deserves to have some cold water thrown on it. Rapid Asian growth is less of a model for the West than many writers claim, and the future prospects for that growth are more limited than almost anyone now imagines. Any such assault on almost universally held beliefs must, of course, overcome a barrier of incredulity. This article began with a disguised account of the Soviet growth debate of 30 years ago to try to gain a hearing for the proposition that we may be revisiting an old error. We have been here before. The problem with this literary device, however, is that so few people now remember how impressive and terrifying the Soviet empire's economic performance once seemed. Before turning to Asian growth, then, it may be useful to review an important but largely forgotten piece of economic history.

'WE WILL BURY YOU'

LIVING IN a world strewn with the wreckage of the Soviet empire, it is hard for most people to realize that there was a time when the Soviet economy, far from being a byword for the failure of socialism, was one of the wonders of the world--that when Khrushchev pounded his shoe on the U.N. podium and declared, "We will bury you," it was an economic rather than a military boast. It is therefore a shock to browse through, say, issues of Foreign Affairs from the mid 1950s through the early 1960s and discover that at least one article a year dealt with the implications of growing Soviet industrial might.

Illustrative of the tone of discussion was a 1957 article by Calvin B. Hoover. Like many Western economists, Hoover criticized official Soviet statistics, arguing that they exaggerated the true growth rate. Nonetheless, he concluded that Soviet claims of astonishing achievement were fully justified: their economy was achieving a rate of growth "twice as high as that attained by any important capitalistic country over any considerable number of years [and] three times as high as the average annual rate of increase in the United States." He concluded that it was probable that "a collectivist, authoritarian state" was inherently better at achieving economic growth than free-market democracies and projected that the Soviet economy might outstrip that of the United States by the early 1970s.

These views were not considered outlandish at the time. On the contrary, the general image of Soviet central planning was that it might be brutal, and might not do a very good job of providing consumer goods, but that it was very effective at promoting industrial growth. In 1960 Wassily Leontief described the Soviet economy as being "directed with determined ruthless skill"--and did so without supporting argument, confident he was expressing a view shared by his readers.

Yet many economists studying Soviet growth were gradually coming to a very different conclusion. Although they did not dispute the fact of past Soviet growth, they offered a new interpretation of the nature of that growth, one that implied a reconsideration of future Soviet prospects. To understand this reinterpretation, it is necessary to make a brief detour into economic theory to discuss a seemingly abstruse, but in fact intensely practical, concept: growth accounting.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE SOVIET SLOWDOWN

IT IS A TAUTOLOGY that economic expansion represents the sum of two sources of growth. On one side are increases in "inputs": growth in employment, in the education level of workers, and in the stock of physical capital (machines, buildings, roads, and so on). On the other side are increases in the output per unit of input; such increases may result from better management or better economic policy, but in the long run are primarily due to increases in knowledge.

The basic idea of growth accounting is to give life to this formula by calculating explicit measures of both. The accounting can then tell us how much of growth is due to each input--say, capital as opposed to labor--and how much is due to increased efficiency.

We all do a primitive form of growth accounting every time we talk about labor productivity; in so doing we are implicitly distinguishing between the part of overall national growth due to the growth in the supply of labor and the part due to an increase in the value of goods produced by the average worker. Increases in labor productivity, however, are not always caused by the increased efficiency of workers. Labor is only one of a number of inputs; workers may produce more, not because they are better managed or have more technological knowledge, but simply because they have better machinery. A man with a bulldozer can dig a ditch faster than one with only a shovel, but he is not more efficient; he just has more capital to work with. The aim of growth accounting is to produce an index that combines all measurable inputs and to measure the rate of growth of national income relative to that index--to estimate what is known as "total factor productivity."

So far this may seem like a purely academic exercise. As soon as one starts to think in terms of growth accounting, however, one arrives at a crucial insight about the process of economic growth: sustained growth in a nation's per capita income can only occur if there is a rise in output per unit of input.

Mere increases in inputs, without an increase in the efficiency with which those inputs are used--investing in more machinery and infrastructure--must run into diminishing returns; input-driven growth is inevitably limited.

How, then, have today's advanced nations been able to achieve sustained growth in per capita income over the past 150 years? The answer is that technological advances have lead to a continual increase in total factor productivity--a continual rise in national income for each unit of input. In a famous estimate, MIT Professor Robert Solow concluded that technological progress has accounted for 80 percent of the long-term rise in U.S. per capita income, with increased investment in capital explaining only the remaining 20 percent.

When economists began to study the growth of the Soviet economy, they did so using the tools of growth accounting. Of course, Soviet data posed some problems. Not only was it hard to piece together usable estimates of output and input (Raymond Powell, a Yale professor, wrote that the job "in may ways resembled an archaeological dig"), but there were philosophical difficulties as well. In a socialist economy one could hardly measure capital input using market returns, so researchers were forced to impute returns based on those in market economies at similar levels of development. Still, when efforts began, researchers were pretty sure about what they would find. Just as capitalist growth had been based on growth in both inputs and efficiency, with efficiency the main source of rising per capita income, they expected to find that rapid Soviet growth reflected both rapid input growth and rapid growth in efficiency.

But what they actually found was that Soviet growth was based on rapid growth inputs--end of story. The rate of efficiency growth was not only unspectacular, it was well below the rates achieved in Western economies. Indeed, by some estimates, it was virtually nonexistent.

The immense Soviet efforts to mobilize economic resources were hardly news. Stalinist planners had moved millions of workers from farms to cities, pushed millions of women into the labor force and millions of men into longer hours, pursued massive programs of education, and above all plowed an ever-growing proportion of the country's industrial output back into the construction of new factories. Still, the big surprise was that once one had taken the effects of these more or less measurable inputs into account, there was nothing left to explain. The most shocking thing about Soviet growth was its comprehensibility.

This comprehensibility implied two crucial conclusions. First, claims about the superiority of planned over market economies turned out to be based on a misapprehension. If the Soviet economy had a special strength, it was its ability to mobilize resources, not its ability to use them efficiently. It was obvious to everyone that the Soviet Union in 1960 was much less efficient than the United States. The surprise was that it showed no signs of closing the gap.

Second, because input-driven growth is an inherently limited process, Soviet growth was virtually certain to slow down. Long before the slowing of Soviet growth became obvious, it was predicted on the basis of growth accounting. (Economists did not predict the implosion of the Soviet economy a generation later, but that is a whole different problem.)

It's an interesting story and a useful cautionary tale about the dangers of naive extrapolation of past trends. But is it relevant to the modern world?

PAPER TIGERS

AT FIRST, it is hard to see anything in common between the Asian success stories of recent years and the Soviet Union of three decades ago. Indeed, it is safe to say that the typical business traveler to, say, Singapore, ensconced in one of that city's gleaming hotels, never even thinks of any parallel to its roach-infested counterparts in Moscow. How can the slick exuberance of the Asian boom be compared with the Soviet Union's grim drive to industrialize?

And yet there are surprising similarities. The newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union of the 1950s, have achieved rapid growth in large part through an astonishing mobilization of resources. Once one accounts for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these countries' growth, one finds little left to explain, Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency.

Consider, in particular, the case of Singapore. Between 1966 and 1990, the Singaporean economy grew a remarkable 8.5 percent per annum, three times as fast as the United States; per capita income grew at a 6.6 percent rate, roughly doubling every decade. This achievement seems to be a kind of economic miracle. But the miracle turns out to have been based on perspiration rather than inspiration: Singapore grew through a mobilization of resources that would have done Stalin proud. The employed share of the population surged from 27 to 51 percent. The educational standards of that work force were dramatically upgraded: while in 1966 more than half the workers had no formal education at all, by 1990 two-thirds had completed secondary education. Above all, the country had made an awesome investment in physical capital: investment as a share of output rose from 11 to more than 40 percent.

Even without going through the formal exercise of growth accounting, these numbers should make it obvious that Singapore's growth has been based largely on one-time changes in behavior that cannot be repeated. Over the past generation the percentage of people employed has almost doubled; it cannot double again. A half-educated work force has been replaced by one in which the bulk of workers has high school diplomas; it is unlikely that a generation from now most Singaporeans will have Ph.D's. And an investment share of 40 percent is amazingly high by any standard; a share of 7O percent would be ridiculous. So one can immediately conclude that Singapore is unlikely to achieve future growth rates comparable to those of the past.

But it is only when one actually does the quantitative accounting that the astonishing result emerges: all of Singapore's growth can be explained by increases in measured inputs. There is no sign at all of increased efficiency. In this sense, the growth of Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore is an economic twin of the growth of Stalin's Soviet Union growth achieved purely through mobilization of resources. Of course, Singapore today is far more prosperous than the U.S.S.R. ever was--even at its peak in the Brezhnev years--because Singapore is closer to, though still below, the efficiency of Western economies. The point, however, is that Singapore's economy has always been relatively efficient; it just used to be starved of capital and educated workers.

Singapore's case is admittedly, the most extreme. Other rapidly growing East Asian economics have not increased their labor force participation as much, made such dramatic improvements in educational levels, or raised investment rates quite as far. Nonetheless, the basic conclusion is the same: there is startlingly little evidence of improvements in efficiency. Kim and Lau conclude of the four Asian "tigers" that "the hypothesis that there has been no technical progress during the postwar period cannot be rejected for the four East Asian newly industrialized countries." Young, more poetically, notes that once one allows for their rapid growth of inputs, the productivity performance of the "Tigers" falls "from the heights of Olympus to the plains of Thessaly.

This conclusion runs so counter to conventional wisdom that it is extremely difficult for the economists who have reached it to get a hearing. As early as 1982 a Harvard graduate student, Yuan Tsao.) found little evidence of efficiency growth in her dissertation on Singapore, but her work was, as Young puts it, "ignored or dismissed as unbelievable." When Kim and Lau presented their work at a 1992 conference in Taipei, it received a more respectful hearing, but had little immediate impact But when Young tried to make the case for input-driven Asian growth at the 1993 meetings of the European Economic Association, he was met with a stone wall of disbelief.

In Young's most recent paper there is an evident tone of exasperation with this insistence on clinging to the conventional wisdom in the teeth of the evidence. He titles the paper "The Tyranny of Numbers"--by which he means that you may not want to believe this, buster, but there's just no way around the data. He begins with an ironic introduction, written in a deadpan, Sergeant Friday, "Just the facts, ma'am" style: "This is a fairly boring and tedious paper, and is intentionally so. This paper provides no new interpretations of the East Asian experience to interest the historian, derives no new theoretical implications of the forces behind the East Asian growth process to motivate the theorist, and draws no new policy implications from the subtleties of East Asian government intervention to excite the policy activist. Instead, this paper concentrates its energies on providing a careful analysis of the historical patterns of output growth, factor accumulation, and productivity growth in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia."

Of course, he is being disingenuous. His conclusion undermines most of the conventional wisdom about the future role of Asian nations in the world economy and, as a consequence, in international politics. But readers will have noticed that the statistical analysis that puts such a different interpretation on Asian growth focuses on the "tigers," the relatively small countries to whom the name "newly industrializing countries" was first applied. But what about the large countries? What about Japan and China?

THE GREAT JAPANESE GROWTH SLOWDOWN

MANY PEOPLE who are committed to the view that the destiny of the world economy lies with the Pacific Rim are likely to counter skepticism about East Asian growth prospects with the example of Japan. Here, after all, is a country that started out poor and has now become the second-largest industrial power. Why doubt that other Asian nations can do the same?

There are two answers to that question. First, while many authors have written of an "Asian system"--a common denominator that underlies all of the Asian success stories--the statistical evidence tells a different story. Japan's growth in the 1950s and 1960s does not resemble Singapore's growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan, unlike the East Asian "tigers," seems to have grown both through high rates of input growth and through high rates of efficiency growth. Today's fast growth economics are nowhere near converging on U.S. efficiency levels, but Japan is staging an unmistakable technological catch-up.

Second, while Japan's historical performance has indeed been remarkable, the era of miraculous Japanese growth now lies well in the past. Most years Japan still manages to grow faster than the other advanced nations, but that gap in growth rates is now far smaller than it used to be, and is shrinking.

The story of the great Japanese growth slowdown has been oddly absent from the vast polemical literature on Japan and its role in the world economy. Much of that literature seems stuck in a time warp, with authors writing as if Japan were still the miracle growth economy of the 1960s and early 1970s. Granted, the severe recession that has gripped Japan since 1991 will end soon if it has not done so already, and the Japanese economy will probably stage a vigorous short-term recovery. The point, however, is that even a full recovery will only reach a level that is far below what many sensible observers predicted 20 years ago.

It may be useful to compare Japan's growth prospects as they appeared 2O years ago and as they appear now. In 1973 Japan was still a substantially smaller and poorer economy than the United States. Its per capita GDP was only 55 percent of America's, while its overall GDP was only 27 percent as large. But the rapid growth of the Japanese economy clearly portended a dramatic change. Over the previous decade Japan's real GDP had grown at a torrid 8.9 percent annually, with per capita output growing at a 7.7 percent rate. Although American growth had been high by its own historical standards, at 3.9 percent (2.7 percent per capita) it was not in the same league. Clearly, the Japanese were rapidly gaining on us.

In fact, a straightforward projection of these trends implied that a major reversal of positions lay not far in the future. At the growth rate of 1963-73, Japan would overtake the United States in real per capita income by 1985, and total Japanese output would exceed that of the United States by 1998! At the time, people took such trend projections very seriously indeed. One need only look at the titles of such influential books as Herman Kahn's The Emerging Japanese Superstate or Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One to remember that Japan appeared, to many observers, to be well on its way to global economic dominance.

Well, it has not happened, at least not so far Japan has indeed continued to rise in the economic rankings, but at a far more modest pace than those projections suggested. In 1992 Japan's per capita income was still only 83 percent of the United States', and its overall output was only 42 percent of the American level. The reason was that growth from 1973 to 1992 was far slower than in the high-growth years: GDP grew only 3.7 percent annually, and GDP per capita grew only 3 percent per year. The United States also experienced a growth slowdown after 1973, but it was not nearly as drastic.

If one projects those post-1973 growth rates into the future, one still sees a relative Japanese rise, but a far less dramatic one. Following 1973-92 trends, Japan's per capita income will outstrip that of the United States in 2002; its overall output does not exceed America's until the year 2047. Even this probably overestimates Japanese prospects. Japanese economists generally believe that their country's rate of growth of potential output, the rate that it will be able to sustain once it has taken up the slack left by the recession, is now no more than three percent. And that rate is achieved only through a very high rate of investment, nearly twice as high a share of GDP as in the United States. When one takes into account the growing evidence for at least a modest acceleration of U.S. productivity growth in the last few years, one ends up with the probable conclusion that Japanese efficiency is gaining on that of the United States at a snail's pace, if at all, and there is the distinct possibility that per capita income in Japan may never overtake that in America. In other words, Japan is not quite as overwhelming an example of economic prowess as is sometimes thought, and in any case Japan's experience has much less in common with that of other Asian nations than is generally imagined.

THE CHINA SYNDROME

FOR THE skeptic, the case of China poses much greater difficulties about Asian destiny than that of Japan. Although China is still a very poor country, its population is so huge that it will become a major economic power if it achieves even a fraction of Western productivity levels. And China, unlike Japan, has in recent years posted truly impressive rates of economic growth. What about its future prospects?

Accounting for China's boom is difficult for both practical and philosophical reasons. The practical problem is that while we know that China is growing very rapidly, the quality of the numbers is extremely poor. It was recently revealed that official Chinese statistics on foreign investment have been overstated by as much as a factor of six. The reason was that the government offers tax and regulatory incentives to foreign investors, providing an incentive for domestic entrepreneurs to invent fictitious foreign partners or to work through foreign fronts. This episode hardly inspires confidence in any other statistic that emanates from that dynamic but awesomely corrupt society.

The philosophical problem is that it is unclear what year to use as a baseline. If one measures Chinese growth from the point at which it made a decisive turn toward the market, say 1978, there is little question that there has been dramatic improvement in efficiency as well as rapid growth in inputs. But it is hardly surprising that a major recovery in economic efficiency occurred as the country emerged from the chaos of Mao Zedong's later years. If one instead measures growth from before the Cultural Revolution, say 1964, the picture looks more like the East Asian "tigers": only modest growth in efficiency, with most growth driven by inputs. This calculation, however, also seems unfair: one is weighing down the buoyant performance of Chinese capitalism with the leaden performance of Chinese socialism. Perhaps we should simply split the difference: guess that some, but not all, of the efficiency gains since the turn toward the market represent a one-time recovery, while the rest represent a sustainable trend.

Even a modest slowing in China's growth will change the geopolitical outlook substantially. The World Bank estimates that the Chinese economy is currently about 40 percent as large as that of the United States. Suppose that the U.S. economy continues to grow at 2.5 percent each year. If China can continue to grow at 10 percent annually, by the year 2010 its economy will be a third larger than ours. But if Chinese growth is only a more realistic 7 percent, Its GDP Will be only 82 percent of that of the United States. There will still be a substantial shift of the world's economic center of gravity, but it will be far less drastic than many people now imagine.

THE MYSTERY THAT WASN'T

THE EXTRAORDINARY record of economic growth in the newly industrializing countries of East Asia has powerfully influenced the conventional wisdom about both economic policy and geopolitics. Many, perhaps most, writers on the global economy now take it for granted that the success of these economies demonstrates three propositions. First, there is a major diffusion of world technology in progress, and Western nations are losing their traditional advantage. Second, the world's economic center of gravity will inevitably shift to the Asian nations of the western Pacific. Third, in what's perhaps a minority view, Asian successes demonstrate the superiority of economies with fewer civil liberties and more planning than we in the West have been willing to accept.

All three conclusions are called into question by the simple observation that the remarkable record of East Asian growth has been matched by input growth so rapid that Asian economic growth, incredibly, ceases to be a mystery.

Consider first the assertion that the advanced countries are losing their technological advantage. A heavy majority of recent tracts on the world economy have taken it as self-evident that technology now increasingly flows across borders, and that newly industrializing nations are increasingly able to match the productivity of more established economics. Many writers warn that this diffusion of technology will place huge strains on Western society as capital flows to the Third World and imports from those nations undermine the West's industrial base.

There are severe conceptual problems with this scenario even if its initial premise is right. But in any case, while technology may have diffused within particular industries, the available evidence provides absolutely no justification for the view that overall world technological gaps are vanishing. On the contrary, Kim and Lau find "no apparent convergence between the technologies" of the newly industrialized nations and the established industrial powers; Young finds that the rates in the growth of efficiency in the East Asian "tigers" are no higher than those in many advanced nations.

The absence of any dramatic convergence in technology helps explain what would otherwise be a puzzle: in spite of a great deal of rhetoric about North-South capital movement, actual capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s have so far been very small--and they have primarily gone to Latin America, not East Asia. Indeed, several of the East Asian "tigers" have recently become significant exporters of capital. This behavior would be extremely odd if these economies, which still pay wages well below advanced-country levels, were rapidly achieving advanced-country productivity. It is, however, perfectly reasonable if growth in East Asia has been primarily input driven, and if the capital piling up there is beginning to yield diminishing returns.

If growth in East Asia is indeed running into diminishing returns, however, the conventional wisdom about an Asian-centered world economy needs some rethinking. It would be a mistake to overstate this case: barring a catastrophic political upheaval, it is likely that growth in East Asia will continue to outpace growth in the West for the next decade and beyond. But it will not do so at the pace of recent years. From the perspective of the year 2010, current projections of Asian supremacy extrapolated from recent trends may well look almost as silly as 1960s-vintage forecasts of Soviet industrial supremacy did from the perspective of the Brezhnev years.

Finally, the realities of East Asian growth suggest that we may have to unlearn some popular lessons. It has become common to assert that East Asian economic success demonstrates the fallacy of our traditional laissez-faire approach to economic policy and that the growth of these economics shows the effectiveness of sophisticated industrial policies and selective protectionism. Authors such as James Fallows have asserted that the nations of that region have evolved a common "Asian system," whose lessons we ignore at our peril. The extremely diverse institutions and policies of the various newly industrialized Asian countries, let alone Japan, cannot really be called a common system. But in any case, if Asian success reflects the benefits of strategic trade and industrial policies, those benefits should surely be manifested in an unusual and impressive rate of growth in the efficiency of the economy. And there is no sign of such exceptional efficiency growth.

The newly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim have received a reward for their extraordinary mobilization of resources that is no more than what the most boringly conventional economic theory would lead us to expect. If there is a secret to Asian growth, it is simply deferred gratification, the willingness to sacrifice current satisfaction for future gain.

That's a hard answer to accept, especially for those American policy intellectuals who recoil from the dreary task of reducing deficits and raising the national savings rate. But economics is not a dismal science because the economists like it that way; it is because in the end we must submit to the tyranny not just of the numbers, but of the logic they express.

Krugman can’t think straight.

 

According to this NWY article, Paul Krugman – Nobel Prize laureate in economics – is worried about falling wages. Never mind the ‘sticky wages’ theorem the Keynesians have been bantering around for decades, here’s what the world looks like today – according to Krugman:

Suppose that workers at the XYZ Corporation accept a pay cut. That lets XYZ management cut prices, making its products more competitive. Sales rise, and more workers can keep their jobs. So you might think that wage cuts raise employment — which they do at the level of the individual employer.

But if everyone takes a pay cut, nobody gains a competitive advantage. So there’s no benefit to the economy from lower wages. Meanwhile, the fall in wages can worsen the economy’s problems on other fronts.

In particular, falling wages, and hence falling incomes, worsen the problem of excessive debt: your monthly mortgage payments don’t go down with your paycheck. America came into this crisis with household debt as a percentage of income at its highest level since the 1930s. Families are trying to work that debt down by saving more than they have in a decade — but as wages fall, they’re chasing a moving target. And the rising burden of debt will put downward pressure on consumer spending, keeping the economy depressed.

Never mind that at last a Keynesian admits that wages are not sticky – and hence falling prices do NOT result in lay-offs due to relatively increased labour cost, and hence deflation does NOT create unemployment. Never mind that the term ‘competitive advantage’ makes no sense in this context. Never mind that we have an institution called ‘bankruptcy’ that allows people to rid themselves of debt once and for all and allows for the reassessment of values. Never mind that since Keynes wrote his silly tract, none of his ideas have stood up to either logic of evidence.

Krugman – you are an incompetent fool.

Buy-American rules shutting out Canadians – and costing Americans

 

Canadians have been whining for some time now about moves by Americans to buy only American goods. Well, it does indeed hurt Canadian exporters, but it certainly also hurts Americans. According to the Toronto Star, a Canadian company has lost a contract for supplying plastic pipes to a navy base in the US. But it only mentions in passing the really dumb part of the story.

But the piping [already installed] is now being ripped out of the ground. Why? Because the pipes are branded with the words Made in Canada.

How this can possibly benefit Americans eludes me. Broken window fallacy anyone?

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Ontario now in business of 'reverse Reaganism'

 

I don’t expect our political ‘leaders’ to have much understanding of economics, foreign affairs, or general science. However, I do from time to time indulge myself in the strange delusion that they have at least some very basic education and some very basic grasp of reality. And then comes along a dolt like Ontario’s Economic Development Minister Michael Bryant and disabuses me of my silly notions by saying something so outrageously barmy and inane, it hurts.

According to this plank,

"The state has got to be strategic and if that's the case, then we need to act as an entrepreneur and invest directly in businesses," Mr. Bryant told a luncheon crowd in Toronto. "This is government choosing winners and losers. This is supposed to be the thing that governments weren't supposed to do. But this is the business that we are in."

Read more on how Ontario is now in the business of 'reverse Reaganism', whatever that means.

Not that it matters what it means, since words seem to have lost all their meaning. There was a time and a place when the word entrepreneur meant something along the lines of “a person who has possession of an enterprise, or venture, and assumes significant accountability for the inherent risks and the outcome”. How does this apply to government? Since when is a government an enterprise? How is anybody in government significantly accountable for the inherent risks and the outcomes?

Mr. Bryant, next time before you open your silly gob, why don’t you do some basic research? I don’t expect you to read Kirzner’s brilliant little tract on the entrepreneur. You wouldn’t understand it anyway. For you, Wikipedia is probably demanding enough.